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Abstract
In this essay, focusing on acts of communication by President Trump and his aides, we explore 
the notions of “post-truth” and “alternative facts”. Adopting a pragmatist perspective, we argue 
that there is no intrinsically accurate language in terms of which to refer to reality. Language, 
rather, is a tool that enables agents to grab hold of causal forces and intervene in the world. 
“Alternative facts” can be created by multi-modal communication to highlight different aspects 
of the world for the purpose of political mobilization and legitimacy. “Post-truth” politics 
reveals the fragmentation of the language game in which mainstream politics has been hitherto 
conducted. We explore the implications that “alternative facts” and “post-truth” have for 
today’s management scholarship. We argue that management scholars should unpack how 
managers navigate strategic action and communication, and how the creation of alternative 
realities is accomplished in conditions of informational abundance and multi-modal 
communication.   
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Ever since the referendum in the UK on exiting the European Union in June 2016 and the 
election of Donald Trump to the Presidency of the United States in November 2016, there has 
been an emerging discourse on “alternative facts” and “post-truth” (Ball, 2017; d'Ancona, 
2017). Further, President Trump’s systematic use of Twitter to provide political commentary 
has highlighted the importance of social media and multi-modal communication at large in 
shaping what people regard as facts and truth. The very terms “alternative facts” and “post-
truth” highlight the increasing recognition that, in a mediated society, what we take to be a fact 
or truth is malleable.   
Although there is no shortage of examples to illustrate “alternative facts” drawn from 
the Trump administration, none is clearer in its simplicity than the controversy that surrounded 
the size of President Trump’s inauguration ceremony in January 2017. It may be recalled that, 
at the time, the then White House Press Secretary, Sean Spicer, famously claimed at a televised 
press conference that “[the inauguration ceremony] was the largest audience to ever witness 
an inauguration—period—both in person and around the globe” (S. Spicer, 2017). Press 
reporters were quick to respond by citing attendance statistics and tweeting photos of empty 
arenas compared to Obama’s inauguration. Trump countered on Twitter, calling the photos 
“fake news” and “phony”. Trump’s senior adviser Kellyanne Conway went further and told 
NBC’s ‘Meet the Press’ that Spicer’s comments were not “falsehoods” but merely “alternative 
facts” (Todd, 2017).  
Seen against a broader perspective, the inauguration size controversy reflected Trump’s 
“running war” (Trump, 2017b ) with the established media, which he repeatedly called 
“dishonest” during and after his election campaign (Trump, 2017c). Trump’s contempt has 
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been replicated by several of his staff. For example, Reince Priebus,  the then White House 
Chief of Staff, said on “Fox News Sunday,” that the administration is going to “fight back tooth 
and nail every day” with the press (Wallace, 2017). “There is an obsession by the media to 
delegitimize this President. We are not going to sit around and let it happen”, he said (Wallace, 
2017).  
The size of the inauguration ceremony as such is a trivial matter. That it turned out to be so 
controversial crystallized early on not only the Trump administration’s perspective on the 
malleability of “facts” and “truth” but illustrated a broader phenomenon: how, on the one hand, 
political polarization weakens common frameworks of understanding and communication, and, 
on the other hand, the role of social media and multi-modal communication in creating and 
sustaining alternative realities. 
The questions of what are “facts” and “truth” are not the exclusive interest of those in 
politics. In recent years, the gap between appearance and reality has become increasingly center 
stage for organizations and managers as well (Davis, 2017). Volkswagen received negative 
publicity in 2015 when the US Environment Protection Agency revealed that the company had 
deliberately tampered with vehicles during emissions testing (for example Rhodes, 2016; 
Siano, Vollero, Conte, & Amabile, 2017). BP came under pressure when it was found 
responsible for the largest accidental oil spill in the petroleum industry’s history at Deepwater 
Horizon, despite its claimed environmental credentials (Kassinis & Panayiotou, 2018; Matejek 
& Gössling, 2014). CEOs feel they are under increased scrutiny because of the proliferation of 
social media and the 24/7 news cycle that has emerged (Per-Ola Karlsson, 2017).  
The purpose of this essay is to understand how the emerging discourse around “alternative 
facts” and “post-truth” relates to strategic action and communication in organizations.  Prior 
studies have prefigured the rise of a “de-materialized” economy in late modernity, in which the 
ability of an organization to control the means of meaning production is beginning to matter 
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more than controlling the means of material production (Tsoukas 1999). Moreover, studies 
have recently begun to usefully explore the role of “bullshitting” (A. Spicer, 2013) in 
organizations. Drawing on philosopher Frankfurt (2009), Spicer suggests that in bullshiting, 
the speaker is unconcerned with the truth and fundamentally preoccupied with pursuing his/her 
own purposes and interests. Bullshitting is “prompted by organizations that are dominated by 
immaterial roles that provide their occupants with little sense of broader social purpose and 
value” (Spicer, 2013:659). However, while clearly engaging in bullshiting (Griffin, 2017), 
Trump goes beyond it, insofar as he uses his high (and anything but immaterial) office to carve 
new meanings through multi-modal communication. The Trump presidency visibly illuminates 
how social media, with its recent technological capabilities and affordances, has significantly 
amplified actors’ ability to engage in meaning production and, thus, in making knowledge 
claims about “reality” more contestable.  Our core argument will be that the use of social media 
has the capacity to elicit new forms of meaning-making for both negative and  positive  
outcomes. In this respect, we argue, our current “post-truth” moment represents both an 
empirical instance of a strategic attack against liberal establishment interests in politics, but 
also a conceptual lens through which to understand multi-modal meaning making for strategic 
effect in organization studies more broadly.  
 The essay is organized as follows. In the next section, we define and explore the terms 
“post-truth” and “alternative facts” in the context of speech acts and language games.  The next 
section focusses on alternative facts and the fragmentation of language games, especially in 
conditions of multi-modal communication. We then analyze the process of meaning making 
through Trump’s strategic use of social media technology and multi-modality. Finally, we tie 
this back to management scholarship to show the implications for strategic action and 
communication, particularly for firms operating in low economic resource environments, and 
for managers who faced entrenched economic and hierarchical interests within organizations. 
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Facts, Speech Acts and Language Games 
Post-truth is defined as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (OED, June 
2017). The term is relatively new, and was identified by the Oxford English Dictionary as the 
‘Word of 2016’ based on its increasing use. However, there is more to “post-truth” than what 
dictionaries convey. 
Austin’s (1962) theory of speech acts provides a sound starting point. Austin defined speech 
acts as utterances that have a performative function. His interest was on how language gets 
used to ‘do’ certain things and influence particular outcomes. Austin differentiated between 
three types of speech acts: locutionary acts are the actual utterances themselves and their 
ostensible meaning; illocutionary acts are the intentions or pragmatic forces motivating the 
utterances; and pre-locutionary acts are the consequences of these acts, such as in realizing 
action. 
In his collection of essays Expression and Meaning (1979), Searle (one of Austin’s students) 
applied speech act theory to ask the question: how do individuals know when they are reading 
fiction or non-fiction? For Searle fact and fiction were two classes of illocutionary acts. For a 
naïve reader picking up a page of “facts” about a murder, it would be impossible to discern 
anything from the words themselves indicating that they were reading a crime report as 
opposed to a Sherlock Holmes story. However, Searle argued that this would be revealed 
through illocutionary acts—such as the way the text is presented, narrative tropes, and so 
forth—that allowed the reader to appreciate the rules governing meaning making for that 
particular text. Searle argued that fiction was guided by a “set of extra-linguistic, non-semantic 
conventions that break the connection between words and the world established by the rules 
[of non-fiction]” (Searle, 1979, p. 66). 
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 In arbitrating these distinctions, Searle acknowledged that some utterances have the effect 
of being “brute facts” (1995, p. 27). Brute facts exist independently of human institutions, 
including language. Although brute facts require the institution of language to enable us to state 
the facts, nonetheless their very existence does not depend on language. “Thus”, notes Searle, 
“the statement that the sun is ninety-three million miles from the earth requires an institution 
of language and an institution of measuring distances in miles, but the fact stated—the fact that 
there is a certain distance between the earth and the sun—exists independently of any 
institution” (1995, p. 27, italics in the original). Similarly, the statement that X number of 
people gathered on the National Mall on 20 January 2017, at around 11.00 am, is an objective 
(or brute) fact. Even if we did not have a language to express such a brute fact, it would still be 
objectively true. Such a claim is based on the correspondence theory of truth (Blackburn, 2017; 
Haack, 1995): statements are true to the extent they “correspond” to reality.  
Pragmatist and hermeneutical philosophers go beyond the correspondence theory of truth to 
make a distinction between the causal force of the world and the facts that may be generated 
for interpretation. Caputo asks playfully: “how many facts are there right now in your kitchen?” 
(2013, p. 216), only to acknowledge that this is not a serious question to answer. “That is 
because we have not specified the frame of reference. Facts are a function of the frame of 
reference that picks them out, which means that there are no un-interpreted facts of the matter. 
But if we reframe the question to ask, “how many knives are found in your kitchen?”, we can 
come up with an answer, hopefully the right answer, the one determined by how many knives 
there really are” (Caputo, 2013, p. 216). Similarly, remarks Rorty:  
“The way in which a blank takes on the form of the die which stamps it has no 
analogy to the relation between the truth of a sentence and the event which the 
sentence is about. When the die hits the blank something causal happens, but as many 
facts are brought into the world as there are languages for describing that causal 
transaction. As Donald Davidson says, causation is not under a description, but 
explanation is. Facts are hybrid entities; that is, the causes for the assertibility of 
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sentences include both physical stimuli and our antecedent choice of response to such 
stimuli” (1991, p. 81, italics in the original). 
Thus, the object in the world that causes us to have beliefs, be it a cat, a murder case, or an 
inauguration, is never context-free (Caputo, 2013). Upon entering human consciousness, it is 
turned into a “fact” under a description created in the context of a practice world  (Spinosa, 
Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997). A hammer exists as a tool for driving nails into wood, by virtue of 
being part of the practice world of, say, carpentry. For something to be, it needs to show up as
something, in the context of a practice world (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2011, p. 343; Dreyfus, 
2017). Objects come with descriptions already attached. 
When, therefore, Rorty (1991) describes facts as hybrid entities, what he means is that our 
“antecedent choice of response” (p.81) to the stimuli we are exposed to comes from the 
particular language we have equipped ourselves to cope with the causally impactful object. The 
latter already has a place in a language game. It is not stripped bare of human concerns. The 
point here is not that there is no independent reality out there that causes us to have beliefs, but 
that the beliefs we are caused to have do not “correspond” to or “represent” a determinate 
(extralinguistic) reality, as it allegedly is (Rorty, 1989, pp. 4-5). There is no language-
independent test of the accuracy of correspondence of a statement with a chunk of the world. 
As Putnam (1996, pp. 113-116) has argued, relationships of reference—how statements refer 
to chunks of reality—are internal to our overall view of the world (Rorty, 1991, p. 6). One 
cannot exit language games to view the world from nowhere (Nagel, 1986). We would not 
know what such a vantage point would be like.   
When, therefore, we agree that “the cat is on the mat” or that “the litmus paper has turned 
blue”, we do not take these statements as “representing” the chunks of reality they refer to, but 
as agreements within a particular language game—agreements that enable us to say that we are 
justified in being caused to believe that the sentence is true (Rorty, 1989, p. 5; 1991, pp. 80-
83).  To say “that we must have respect for facts is just to say that we must, if we are to play a 
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certain language game, play by the rules” (Rorty, 1991, p. 81). In that sense, there is no ideal 
or intrinsically accurate language in terms of which to refer to reality. Language, on this 
pragmatist view, is a tool that gives us “a way of grabbing hold of causal forces and making 
them do what we want, altering ourselves and our environment to suit our aspirations” (Rorty, 
1991, p. 81). The critical question is not ‘are you representing reality adequately?’ but ‘what 
are you trying to do with the language you are using?’ 
Multi-modal communication and the fragmentation of language games 
With the above in mind, let us turn our attention to the notion of “alternative facts”. Although 
the term is relatively new, we suggest that the illocutionary force it signifies is as old as 
language - the generation of competing perspectives induced by political rivalry for strategic 
effect. In a  democracy, typically, every opposition counters the government’s claims by 
pointing at “alternative facts”. For example, when the government highlights the higher growth 
rate achieved, the opposition usually focuses on what the government conveniently passes by: 
wage stagnation and the distribution of income. If the government proudly points at the low 
unemployment rate, the opposition will likely insist on the quality of jobs created and the 
pockets of high unemployment in the country; and so on. In short, in a competitive political 
system, such as a liberal democracy, “facts” claimed by one side will likely be responded to by 
“alternative facts” of the other side (Ball, 2017; d'Ancona, 2017).  
Trump is a master of using multiple language games. He reframes “facts” by cultivating 
contexts in which “alternative facts” have meaning for their audiences. The distinctiveness of 
the communication context Trump draws on is its disintermediation: the enormous 
proliferation of mediated communication in a 24/7 media landscape and the increasing 
fragmentation of language games through the use of social media signify a new environment 
for “alternative facts” and “post-truth” meaning-making, in which established power relations 
(e.g. press editors as control filters) are being subverted by direct communications that enable 
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broader reach, whilst simultaneously allowing recipients to interpret what they see in their own 
ways based on their contexts (d'Ancona, 2017; Davis, 2017).  Moreover, these technologies are 
never used exclusively by Trump’s media strategy team, but are deployed interdependently or 
multi-modally so as to shift audience attention from one format to the other to “win” in modes 
where he does well, and leverage their affordances to maximal effect. It is possible to make 
sense of this through an updated understanding of Austin and Searle’s speech act theory (for 
example Gond, Cabantous, Harding, & Learmonth, 2016).  
Let us revisit the size of Trump’s inauguration incident, which is but one example of “post-
truth” meaning making amongst many others on display in the Trump presidency. One might 
argue, as NBC’s Chuck Todd did, that certain claims are utterly false and that certain “alterative 
facts are just falsehoods”. The gathering of thousands of people on the National Mall has the 
causal status of the die-hitting-the-blank: we are caused by the state of the world to see 
something. When, however, this nonlinguistic causality is stated in sentences or pictures, 
several facts are created, depending on the language used. The seemingly innocent question 
‘how many people watched on the National Mall President-elect Trump’s inauguration?’ 
presupposes some “antecedent choice of response” (Rorty, 1991, p. 81), namely a language 
game. It could be the language game of everyday life, as when two friends converse leisurely 
in a café; or it could be the language game of the National Park Service, which routinely collects 
daily statistics of such matters; or it could be the language game of competitive politics, in 
which case the question is loaded with political significance, since the number of people 
gathered connotes popular support (or not) and confers political legitimacy (or not).  
When, therefore, political interlocutors do not agree on the size of the Trump inauguration 
and engage in acrimonious debates about such a seemingly “brute fact”, it reveals that the 
language game of politics has taken perhaps a new turn to become divisively opportunistic and 
self-serving. Interlocutors’ disagreement about the political equivalent of “the cat is on the mat” 
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indicates that the hitherto agreed rules of the language game of politics have broken down and 
are no longer respected.  
Indeed, few statements are simpler than stating the number of people gathered in a particular 
place at a particular date and time. However,  there are alternative ways in which this statement 
can be true, and different modes of communication that can bring meaning to bear with varying 
illocutionary force. One interlocutor who wishes to break faith in the large size of the 
inauguration may use visual images (for example an empty National Mall) to debunk verbal 
statements to the contrary. An interlocutor who wishes to bolster faith in the opposite argument 
may drive attention to television where Trump’s charisma (e.g. speech making at a well-
attended supporter’s party) can cast doubt on the “truth” that he is unpopular or illegitimate. 
Moving between these multiple modes of communication does not change the possibility for 
language games: it simply makes the gaming more possible, more immediate, and more 
ubiquitous by bringing the illocutionary force of each modality to bear on the argument at hand.  
To paraphrase Rorty (1991, p. 80), then, the malleability of the “fact” in question signifies 
the fragility of the previous political agreements about the consequences of the fact. The causal 
independence of the inauguration from commentators does not mean that the inauguration can 
be seen ‘as it is’ and then interpreted. Rather, the very question of ‘how many people watched 
the inauguration’ arises in the context of a political language game. It is not a bare number, 
stripped of human interests and concerns, but is embedded in a particular context or game. In 
that sense, contra Searle, all facts are really “institutional facts”, insofar as they presuppose an 
institution and the definitional work institutions carry out (Searle, 1995, pp. 27-28; 2010, pp. 
10-11).  
Of course, both sides of the debate refer their statements concerning inauguration size to
some state in the world. However, their reference is internal to each side’s perspective on  the 
world (Putnam, 1996). This is why the question “how many people attended the Trump 
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inauguration?” can be answered in several ways, depending on how interlocutors use the 
relevant words and pictures. As, Putnam (1996) remarks, “truth does not transcend use. 
Different statements […] can be true in the same situation because the words—in some cases, 
the logical words themselves—are used differently” (pp. 115-116). In sum, pragmatist 
philosophy recognizes how this misunderstanding can come about, but it is late modernity that 
makes the possibilities for verbal/visual contradiction more acute. 
Post-truth and meaning making in multi-modal communication 
Two things stand out in how Trump’s post-inauguration communication was managed, which 
illuminate a modern method to meaning production. First, Trump’s post-inauguration 
communication strategy is not really about the inauguration. It extends to at least two additional 
games he is playing with audiences based on “truths” that resonate with them: (a) the elitism 
and aloofness of the liberal establishment media, and (b) his legitimacy as their elected 
representative.  
For example, when Trump and his aides talk about “deliberately false reporting” and the 
“dishonesty of the media” (S. Spicer, 2017; Trump, 2017), he is engaging in a conversation 
with a large, conservative base who feel left behind by the preoccupations of liberal elites. 
When Trump activates this emotion by calling for a “running war with the media”, he is turning 
the traditional language game of political competition into a war-like language game, in which, 
like in all wars, propaganda, or at least the self-serving use of whatever evidence one can get 
hold of, is a defensible tactic. Misquoting statistics is but one tactic of war (for example, Spicer 
later admitted his use of DC Metro public transit statistics was wrong, but only after the battle 
had been fought and won -  see Gajanan, 2017; Hunt, 2017). This is a similar “truth”  pervading 
through other language games, such as climate change denialism and anti-immigration policies 
(Knight 2013). Trump is mobilizing these liberal issues to activate his base and play the 
language game of ‘war’ and anti-establishmentarianism.  
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Similarly, when Trump and his aides reframe the conversation to claim “this was the largest 
audience to ever witness an inauguration”, he is framing a conversation about legitimacy. 
Notice how quickly Trump  shifted the terms of the debate from the crowd size on the National 
Mall to unverified views “around the globe” watching online and on television (S. Spicer, 
2017) (Talev & Jacobs, 2017). Like Putnam’s objects in the room, “inauguration audience” is 
a linguistic object whose use is not fixed by the world itself but by the use that is made of it 
(Putnam, 1996, p. 114). Different uses of “inauguration audience” generate different statements 
(say those of the New York Times versus those by Spicer), which can, potentially, all be true 
(Putnam, 1996, p. 115).    
Trump’s goal overall, then, is to provide an alternative reality to what the “media” projects 
about him, and one that resonates for constituencies he needs for strategic, political ends. 
Trump-ism is a recycling of ‘post-modernist’ or ‘relativist’ modes of thinking and 
communicating by conservative power brokers (Anderson, 2017). They shape and produce 
alternative facts by tapping into and playing language games that operate outside the norms of 
liberal establishment media but have meaning to their constituents and their local context.  
A second crucial point in Trump’s post-inauguration communication strategy is how he is 
able to control the means of meaning production. As much as possible, Trump seeks to 
communicate in his own words without the filtering effect of editors, interviews, or journalists 
interpreting his message. This is why Twitter is so useful for Trump. It allows him to control 
the message received by his base so he can influence the timing, phraseology, and context for 
their interpretive benefit with minimal interference or interpretation by editors who can 
misapply the language game.  
Like television, Twitter, Facebook, and other social media technologies activate what 
Thompson has called ‘responsive action in distant contexts’ (Thompson 1995: 109). Unlike a 
face-to-face conversation where producer and recipient can co-construct meaning 
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interpretations in real time (Knight, Paroutis, & Heracleous, 2018), recipients respond 
indirectly to Trump (the producer) based on media messages they receive on social media. 
Thus, these messages ‘are elaborated, refined, criticized, praised and commented on by 
recipients who take the messages received as the subject matter of discussions with one another 
and with others’ (Thompson 1995: 110). 
The discussions with one another and with others is central to how Trump’s post-truth 
meaning making is amplified. Trump relies on his tweets spreading, either by re-tweets, but 
more significantly through coverage across other media technologies such as on Facebook, 
chat forums, blogs, You Tube channels, press, and ultimately broadcast television. Trump has 
also focused on changing the instrumentation undergirding these means of meaning production. 
For example, Trump has re-engineered the layout of the traditional press conference since 
becoming President. Usually conducted in the 49-seat James S. Brady Press Briefing Room in 
the White House as a verbal exercise in which journalists ask the President questions and report 
responses in the papers, Trump has shifted the format of conferences to fewer and shorter 
questions and amplified the visual spectacle (Marantz, 2017). He has installed “Skype seats” 
in the auditorium to field questions from around the country, and broadcast responses direct to 
television. He has also invited “floaters” (freelance journalists with loose journalist 
accreditation) into the Briefing Room to tweet messages via photos, videos, and tweets directly 
to the public through blogging sites and social media so as to amplify their multi-modal effect. 
Trump’s multi-modal social media strategy allows him to get to the front-line of political 
constituencies directly to play his language games. But his strategy is also geared toward a 
tactical goal of driving traffic to cable news television broadcast on a daily basis where he can 
sell his message in a more elaborated, televisual form. Ross Douthat (2018) at the New York 
Times has convincingly illuminated this point, arguing that television rather than social media 
is the making of Trump as President. Television is where Trump developed his original persona 
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(on The Apprentice); it is how his tweets are re-broadcast and commentated upon, and it is the 
basis upon which he builds a relationship with news anchors who invite him on their show to 
further elaborate his news commentary. It is well reported that television is the first place 
Trump goes in the morning, and the last place he tunes out.  
Trump’s command of the televisual allows him to play language games that tap into 
emotions in ways that traditional text-based language games may not. Returning to the 
“inauguration audience”, Trump uses this object in a particular way that allows him to also 
substantiate his broader point about “the enthusiasm of the inauguration” (Spicer, 2017). After 
all, the inauguration audience matters insofar as it signifies political appeal or “enthusiasm” for 
the President. To prosecute this case, Trump’s aides direct audiences back to live coverage of 
his speech at the CIA, soon after the inauguration,  thus interweaving the language game about 
the inauguration proper with the visual depiction of the “raucous overflow crowd” of some 
400-plus CIA employees and the “five-minute standing ovation” that Trump  receives there  
(S. Spicer, 2017).  
Again, the world does not tell us how words like “enthusiasm” must be used – that depends 
on the speaker’s conceptual choices, in light of his/her view of the world (Putnam, 1996, p. 
114). By giving sense to this word through grand hand gestures, distal facial positioning, and 
confident posture, Trump seeks to tap into the reservoir of ‘greatness’, of ‘winning’, of ‘self-
confidence’ in an emotive way. The visuality of television allows his charisma to be manifest, 
and allows him to literally dominate the stage on which these emotional issues are adjudicated 
by audiences.  
It is therefore too simplistic to say that Trump’s communication strategy “masks” reality. 
He is changing the language game of politics itself by creating a new game, motivated by 
conservative causes, and enabled by a new technological means of meaning production 
enhanced by social media networks, direct messaging, and multi-modal techniques. With this 
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apparatus in place, Trump’s post-truth America reminds us that even the hardest of facts are 
“hard”, not so much because they correspond to the world as it is, but because they are “an 
artifact produced by our choice of language game” (Rorty, 1991, p. 80). It is sustained by deep 
divisions in our politick and a fragmentation of audiences: a sense of civic community between 
elites and non-elites that is breaking down; common understandings of concepts that is 
becoming ever so difficult to be achieved; and power as what matters most, pushing reasonable 
interpretation to the back seat.  
What social media-powered “post-truth” implies for management research 
Conceived in these terms, the rise of “post-truth” and “alternative facts” may hold several 
implications for scholars interested in making sense of modern management challenges. Below 
we discuss three: alternative facts and organizational truth claims; empowerment, post-truth 
and discursive battles; and power and multi-modal communication.  
1. Alternative facts and organizational truth claims. Post-truth contests permeate 
organizations. Insofar as organizations are pervaded with ambiguity (March, 2010), it is often 
nearly impossible to pinpoint with certainty the “truth” behind an organization’s success or 
decline, which is built over many years, and it is difficult to infer reliable lessons from the past 
to guide future actions. Ambiguity is endemic (March, 2010, p. 3). An appreciation of post-
truth helps provide fresh impetus to the dramaturgical perspective on organizations (Mangham 
& Overington, 1987; March, 2010), namely to viewing organizations as enacting prevalent 
social myths and organizational members as playing their roles on the organizational stage 
(Bolman & Deal, 2017). Truth is not so much correspondence with reality as enacting socially 
acceptable drama that resonates with an audience. Moreover, it helps draw attention  more 
strongly to the way organizations and managers construct narratives and undertake symbolic 
acts to justify themselves to internal and external audiences (Maguire & Hardy, 2013; Tsoukas, 
1999; Gabriel, 2004). Ambiguity enables accounting for outcomes in multiple ways, and, thus, 
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for all sorts of “alternative facts” to be mobilized for particular purposes. Which ones are 
highlighted, what justifications are publicly projected, and what narratives are offered, provide 
fascinating topics to explore.  
Yet this post-truth moment in politics illuminates something new for organizations as well: 
the types and affordances of communication technologies at organizations’ disposal that open 
up opportunities and risks to organizations in a way that subvert classic power differentials. To 
appreciate the scale of disruption, consider the Shell versus Greenpeace conflict in the North 
Sea in 1995 over the disposal of Brent Spar, a defunct oil platform. This was a case study par 
excellence in “alterative facts”. Whereas Shell emphasized scientific “facts” contained in 
official reports—claiming that the effect of disposing Brent Spar in the ocean would have had 
negligible impact on the environment—Greenpeace chose to highlight heterodox scientific 
accounts that underscored the difficulty of predicting environmental impact. Moreover, while 
Shell was narrowly concerned with the disposal of Brent Spar, Greenpeace took such disposal 
to create precedent for how the rest of decommissioned platforms in the North Sea would be 
disposed of (Tsoukas, 1999). Each actor in the conflict produced different claims, which drew 
on different ‘facts’, and generated competing narratives internal to each actor’s distinctive 
worldview (see, Maguire & Hardy, 2013).  
Tsoukas (1999) argued at the time that what was so striking about Greenpeace’s influence 
over Shell  was the extent to which they dominated television coverage, and made knowledge 
claims about Shell  that influenced audience opinions in the international ‘agora’ – that is, the 
sphere of public opinion in which individuals form their consumer preferences. This allowed a 
relatively small, low resource organization (Greenpeace) to outcompete a well-resourced 
organization (Shell), upending a traditional assumption in strategic management about the 
importance of controlling critical material resources in competing for strategic advantage. 
Tsoukas (1999) used this to suggest a “de-materialized” economy was emerging in late 
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modernity in which controlling symbolic power could be more influential than controlling the 
capital means of production. By ‘owning’ the means of symbolic production through influence 
over televised media coverage, Greenpeace was able to subvert existing power holders and 
make knowledge claims that had an impact on Shell’s license to operate and ability to work 
with stakeholders and customers.   
The internet and social media has made ‘the agora’ more populous, more connected, more 
responsive, and therefore more consequential for strategy making and strategy participants. 
Insofar as informational abundance, multi-modal communication, and the proliferation of 
social media, as well as the fracturing of dominant business or political language games 
(Bauman, 2010; Tsoukas, 2005) are main features of late modernity, it is important to explore 
how claims to “truth” are projected, contested, and established. Management scholars, 
particularly from the critical tradition, have pointed out how entrenched corporate power 
holders can take advantage of this by way of corporate spin, impression management, and 
greenwash (for example Brown & Jones, 2000; Harvey, Tourky, Knight, & Kitchen, 2017; 
McDonnell & King, 2013).  
2. Empowerment, post-truth and discursive battles. While post-truth and alternative facts 
tend to be used in a negative way to highlight power holder’s sway over a malleable reality, 
few scholars have yet highlighted the potentially positive outcomes from this same post-truth 
meaning making process, at least in the sense of subverting  entrenched power. In 2017, for 
example, several management controversies emerged, in which the under-powered and 
disenfranchised mobilized social media to overthrow or undermine corporate hierarchies. 
Travis Kalanick, the founder and CEO of ride-hailing service Uber, was ousted in June 2017 
after a report about the company’s aggressive culture and inappropriate treatment of women 
and employees went viral on social media (Isaac, 2017). Later that year, movie mogul Harvey 
Weinstein, co-founder of The Weinstein Company, was forced to step down after allegations 
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of sexual harassment and abuse were revealed and gained pace on social media (Farrow, 2017). 
This prompted a wider #Metoo social media campaign, in which victims of sexual harassment 
and abuse in the workplace felt empowered to ‘out’ offenders, leading to resignations across 
many organizations and sectors (Khonmami, 2017).  
In each case, these truth claims were contested by the power holders and/or their supporters. 
Some commentators and investors, for example, remarked that Uber’s culture was not “toxic” 
but conducive to the creativity needed for disruptive innovation (see Hook & Kuchler, 2017; 
Thornhill, 2017). Weinstein, also, disputed that claims against him on the basis that his 
encounters were consensual (BBC, 2018). In other cases, powerful companies lost arguments 
in the court of public opinion directly impacting their financial performance. For example, the 
European Union applied fines on materially and symbolically powerful corporations such as 
Apple and Google (see Waters, Toplensky, & Ram, 2017) based on EU claims about tax 
avoidance and market dominance respectively. These were contested by the corporations, 
pointing to “alternative facts” and seeking to project the image of creative wealth creators rather 
than tax avoiders or market exploiters. 
 Which account prevails is the outcome of, among other things, discursive battles. Yet social 
media not only creates a new agora for firms to compete in. It also provides a new way for 
internal organizational conflicts to emerge beyond an organization’s boundaries that can be 
very consequential. Indeed, several Weinstein accusers later confessed that they felt compelled 
to suppress ‘the truth’ whilst acting under the company’s oppressive non-disclosure 
agreements, but felt more able to come forward when their experience was legitimated within 
the broader discourse around sexual harassment (Farrow, 2017). In the future, management 
scholars could be more attuned to how this new era of social media openness is changing the 
context for meaning making, and opening up new forms of power relations that influence the 
dynamics between firms (e.g. Greenpeace vs Shell) as well as within organizations themselves 
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(e.g. Uber and The Weinstein Company). What alternatives to accepted “facts” are mobilized, 
by what agents, for what purposes, with what effects, all become important topics that relate to 
the management of organizational change, reputational management, institutional 
entrepreneurship, and innovation.  
3. Power and multi-modal communication. A related implication for management scholars 
is the opportunity to explore in greater detail how executives (CEOs in particular) actually use 
multi-modal communication to project favourable images of themselves and/or their 
organizations to build personal and/or corporate reputations (Bloom and Rhodes, 2018; 
Rindova et al, 2006, 2007). It is increasingly the case that managers not only communicate 
through talk and written text (Spee & Jarzabkowski, 2011), but also visually through the adept 
use of PowerPoint presentations and data visualizations (Knight et al., 2018), as well as body 
gestures (Wenzel & Koch, 2018). Trump, after all, is both a politician and a businessman. If he 
is to be believed, his practice (refined over many years) of switching between television 
coverage, appearances in the newspapers, and in-person negotiations in meetings, helped him 
to build up an image of success in the commercial agora that led to strategic advantages in his 
business dealings. Yet how executives construct these competitive dynamics through multi-
modal communication is largely un-examined in the literature (Boczkowski and Orlikowski, 
2004). 
Knight et al’s (2018) study of how management consultants influence the strategy process 
offers some insight into this based on how managers act within organizations. The study found 
that consultants exerted considerable influence over the direction of the strategy process by 
deliberately shifting from the PowerPoint slides, to the conversations, to how those emergent 
ideas were depicted visually, and back again, to shape the direction of strategy meaning 
making. The study also found that different kinds of visual techniques (e.g. text slides, pictures, 
graphs, amongst others) afforded opportunities to tackle different kinds of issues – be they 
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politically and emotionally charged, logically complex, or widely accepted. Their study 
described strategy making as a visual semiotic process in which the interdependence between 
talk, text, and visuality moved meaning making on. This is somewhat analogous to Trump’s 
use of multimodal modes of communication to sustain political dominance: he has used Twitter 
(one mode of communication) to drive attention to television broadcast (a second mode of 
communication), thereby leveraging the affordances of each mode. Twitter is instantaneous 
and brief, allowing for controversial statements that get broadcast widely with little 
clarification. Television, on the other hand, is emotionally charged, allowing for the 
iconography of stadiums and crowds to complement grand hand gestures and provocative 
rhetoric.  
Future studies could go further by examining the affordances of new kinds of 
communication technologies, the effects of new combinations of semiotic practices, or 
exploring extreme cases of success or failure in the public agora. In 2009, members of the 
Climate Research Unit at the University of East Anglia became the subjects of international 
attention when climate sceptics hacked into their email servers and published confidential 
email dialogues between scientific researchers, including reference to a methodological “trick” 
used in the presentation of data for publication (Revkin, 2009). Although no wrong-doing was 
found, the research unit in question attracted negative attention, illustrating how hackers could 
take language out of context to marginalize actors and de-legitimate reputations (Henig, 2009). 
Interestingly, this problem arose partly because the very purpose behind the data – to show that 
climate change was real – poorly achieved that task because the affordance of scientific figures 
lacked the immediacy through which a ‘brute fact’ (i.e. climate change) could be visually 
appraised and made ‘real’ to non-expert audiences (Knight, 2013). Management issues that 
face similar visualization challenges – such as diversity and social inclusion in the workplace, 
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climate change accountability, data privacy, amongst others – are useful contexts in which 
battles over what is “truth” and what are “alternative facts” might be played out. 
Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, the discourse on “post-truth” and “alternative facts” reminds us, sometimes 
painfully, that what we take to be facts and truth are heavily dependent on the language games 
we take part in. If we happen not to wonder about facts, it is because we have faith in the rules 
of the relevant language games, and vice versa. Fixing a language game that does not command 
our allegiance requires generating more trust not better facts. This is as important in politics as 
in business. The more business organizations are seen to be self-serving and unaccountable, 
the less trust they will elicit and the less credible their statements will be. Moreover, since any 
claims made are made within particular contexts of communication, it is important to turn 
management scholars’ attention to the multi-modal communication within which 
contemporary discursive battles are increasingly carried out. Exploring how different modes 
activate and empower (or not) new audiences to unseat (or bolster) established power relations 
within and around organizations provides new opportunities for management research. 
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